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1.Introduction
In "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," published in the July/August 1973
Journal of Political Economy, I presented an analysis of the "marriage
market." This paper extends the analysis in that paper to include caring
between mates, polygamous marital arrangements, genetic selection
related to assortive mating, and separation, divorce, and remarriage. Its
purpose is both to enrich the discussion in Part I and to show the power
of this approach in handling different kinds of marital behavior.
In Part I (1973). I offered a simplified model of marriage that relies
on two basic assumptions: (1) each person tries to find a mate who
maximizes his or her well-being, with well-being measured by the con-
sumption of household-produced commodities, and (2) the "marriage
market" is assumed to be in equilibrium, in the sense that no person could
change mates and become better off. I argued that the gain from marriage
compared to remaining single for any two persons is positively related to
their incomes, the relative difference in their wage rates, and the level of
nonmarket-productivity-augmenting variables, such as education or
beauty.
The optimal association between mates with respect to different traits,
such as ability, education, race, income, and height, was analyzed. I
showed that positive associations, matings of likes, are usually optimal,
although with respect to some traits mating of unlikes is optimal, for
example, with wage rates. The division of the total "output" produced
I am indebted for helpful comments to Isaac Ehrlich, Robert T. Michael, Richard
Posner, T. W. Schultz, GeorgeJ. Stigler, and members of the Workshop in Applications
of Economics at the University of Chicago. This research has been supported by a grant
from the Ford Foundation to the National Bureau of Economic Research for the study
of the economics of population. This paper is not an official NBER publication, since it
has not been reviewed by the NBER Board of Directors.
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by mates is not assumed to be given a priori, but is determined by the
nature of the marriage-market equilibrium.
The simplified analyses in Part I have now been extended in several
directions. The effect of "love" and caring between mates on the nature
of equilibrium in the marriage market is considered. Polygamy is dis-
cussed, and especially the relation between its incidence and the degree
of inequality among men and the inequality in the number of men and
women. The implications of different sorting patterns for inequality in
family resources and genetic natural selection are explored. The assump-
tion of complete information about all potential mates is dropped and I
consider the searchfor information through dating, coeducational
schools, "trial" marriages, and other ways. This search is put in a life-
cyclecontextthatincludesmarriage,having children,sometimes
separation and divorce, remarriage, and so forth.
2.Love, Caring, and Marriage
In Part I, I ignored "love," that cause of marriage glorified in the Amer-
ican culture. At an abstract level, love and other emotional attachments,
such as sexual activity or frequent close contact with a particular person,
can be considered particular nonmarketable household commodities, and
nothing much need be added to the analysis, in the earlier paper, of the
demand for commodities. That is,if an important set of commodities
produced by households results from "love," the sorting of mates that
maximizes total commodity output over all marriages is partly deter-
mined by the sorting that maximizes the output of these commodities.
The whole discussion in Part I (1973) would continue to be relevant.
There is a considerable literature on the effect of different variables
such as personality, physical appearance, education, or intelligence, on
the likelihood of different persons loving each other. Since I do not have
anything to add to the explanation of whether or why one person would
love another, my discussion concentrates on some effects of love on
marriage. In particular, since loving someone usually involves caring
about what happens to him or her,1 I concentrate on working out several
implications, for marriage, of "caring."
An inclusive measure of "what happens" is given by the level of com-
modity consumption, and the natural way for an economist to measure
"caring" is through the utility function.2 That is, if M cares about F,
M's utility would depend on the commodity consumption of F as well as
on his own; graphically, M's indifference curves in figure 1 are negatively
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language includes in its definitions of love,
"affectionate concern for the well-being of others," and "the profoundly tender or
passionate affection for a person of the opposite sex."
2Thisformulation is taken from my paper, "A Theory of Social Interactions" (1969).




inclined with respect to Zm and Z1, the commodities consumed by M and
F respectively.3 If M cared as much about F as about himself (I call
this "full" caring), the slopes of all the indifference curves would equal
unity (in absolute value) along the 45° line;4 if he cared more about
himself, the slopes would exceed unity, and conversely if he cared more
about F.
Point cinfigure 1 represents the allocation of commodities to M and F
that is determined by equilibrium in the marriage market. Only if M
were married to F could he transfer commodities to F, since household
commodities are transferable within but not between households. If the
terms of transfer are measured by the line AB, he moves along AB to
point e:hetransfers cd and F receives de. Presumably commodities can be
transferred within a household without loss, so that AB would have a slope
of unity. Then the equilibrium position after the transfer would be on the
Since there is only a single aggregate commodity, saying that M's utility depends
on F's consumption is equivalent to saying that M's utility depends on F's utility (assum-
ing that F does not care about M). If many commodities Z1 Zq, were consumed,
M's utility would depend on F's utility if U'" = g(Z,, Z51)]
where g describes the indifference surface of F. Hence =
this ratio is F's marginal rate of substitution between Z, and Z,.
"Full" caring might also imply that the indifference curves were straight lines with
a slope of unity, that Z, was a perfect substitute for
B Zm
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45° line with full caring, and to the right of this line if M preferred his
own consumption to F's.
Most people no doubt find the concept of a market allocation of com-
modities to beloved mates strange and unrealistic. And, as we have seen,
caring can strikingly modify the market allocation between married
persons. For example, the final allocation (point e) after the transfer from
M to F has more equal shares than does the market allocation (point c).5
Moreover,if F also cared about M, she would modify the market allocation
by transferring resources to M from anywhere in the interval Ae' until she
reached a point e',6 generally to the left of e. The market completely
determines the division, of output only in the interval e'e: positions in Be
are modified to e, and those in Ae' are modified to e'. Furthermore, if each
fully cares for the other, points e and e' are identical and on the 45° line.
Then the total amount produced by M and F would be shared equally,
regardless of the market-determined division. This concept of caring
between married persons, therefore, does imply sharing—equal sharing
when the caring is full and mutual—and is thus consistent with the
popular belief that persons in love "share." -
Sharingimplies that changes in the sex ratio or other variables con-
sidered in section 4 of Part I (1973) would not modify the actual distribu-
tion of output between married M and F (unless the market-mandated
distribution were in the interval ee'). This is another empirical implication
of caring that can be used to determine its importance.
I indicated in the earlier paper that total income would be less than
total output in a marriage if resources were spent "policing" the market-
mandated division of output, whereas total income would exceed total
output if some output were a "family" commodity, that is, were consumed
by both mates. Caring raises total income relative to total output both by
reducing policing costs and by increasing the importance of family
commodities.
Consider first the effect of caring on policing costs. "Policing" reduces
the probability that a mate shirks duties or appropriates more output than
is mandated by the equilibrium in the marriage market.7 Caring reduces
the need for policing: M's incentive to "steal" from his mate F is weaker
if M cares about F because a reduction in F's consumption also lowers M's
utility. Indeed, caring often completely eliminates the incentive to
"steal" and thus the need to police. Thus, at point e in the figure, M
has no incentive to "steal" from F because a movement to the right
along AB would lower M's utility.8 Therefore, if M cares about F suf.
'Provided it were in the interval Ac, M would not modify the market allocation.
assume that AB also gives the terms of transfer for F, and that e'isthe point of
tangency between AB and her indifference curves.
'Policing is necessary in any partnership or corporation, or, more generally, in any
cooperative activity (see Becker 1971, pp. 122—23; Alchian and Demsetz 1972).
A fortiori, a movement along any steeper line—the difference between AB and this
line measuring the resources used up in "stealing"—would also lower M's utility.A THEORY OF MARRIAGE Si5
ficiently to transfer commodities to her, F would not need to "police"
M's consumption.9 Consequently, marriages with caring would have
fewer resources spent on "policing" (via allowances or separate check-
ing accounts?) than other marriages would.
M's income at e exceeds his own consumption because of the utility he
gets from F's consumption. Indeed, his income is the sum of his and F's
consumption, and equals OBOA), the output produced by M and F.
Similarly, F's income exceeds her own consumption if she benefits from
M's consumption.'° Caring makes family income greater than family
output because some output is jointly consumed. At point e, all of F's
and part of M's consumption would be jointly consumed. Since both e
and e' are on the 450 line with mutual and full caring, the combined
incomes of M and F would then be double their combined output: all of
M's and all of F's consumption would be jointly consumed.
Love and caring between two persons increase their chances of being
married to each other in the optimal sorting. That love and caring cannot
reduce these chances can be seen by assuming that they would be married
to each other in the optimal sorting even if they did not love and care for
each other. Then they must also be married to each other in the optimal
sorting if they do love and care for each other because love raises com-
modity output and caring raises their total income by making part of their
output a "family" commodity. Hence, their incomes when there is love
and caring exceed their incomes when there is not. Consider the following
matrix of outputs:
F1 F2
With no caring, this is also the matrix of total incomes,11 and M1F1 and
M2F2 would be the optimal sorting if incomes were sufficiently divisible
to obtain, say, the division given in parenthesis. With mutual and full








With mutual and full caring, neither mate would have to "police." On the other
hand, if each cared more about the other than about himself (or herself), at least one of
them, say M, would want to transfer resources that would not be accepted. Then F
would "police" to prevent undesired transfers from M. This illustrates a rather general
principle; namely, that when the degree of caring becomes sufficiently great, behavior
becomes similar to that when there is no caring.
10F'sincome equals the sum of her consumption and a fraction of M's consumption
that is determined by the slope of F's indifference curve at point e. See the formulation in
section 1 of the Mathematical Appendix.
'We abstract from other kinds of "family" commodities because they can be analyzed
in exactly the same way that caring is.
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the income ofF1, would equal 8 >5;12 clearly, M1 would still
be married to F1 in the optimal sorting.
That love and caring can bring a couple into the optimal sorting is
shown by the following matrix of outputs:
F1 F2 F3
M1 [10 6 5
(4,6)
M2 9 10 4 . (2)
(6,4)
M31 2 3 10
L (5,5)
Without love and caring the optimal sorting is M1F1, M2F2, and M3F3,
with a set of optimal incomes given in parenthesis. If, however, M1 and
F2 were in love and had mutual and full caring, the optimal sorting would
become M1F2, M2F1, and M3F3 because the incomes resulting from this
sorting,m12 = = k> 6,1and,say,m21 =f21 = 4+,and
m33 = = 5,can block the sorting along the diagonal.
Does caring per se—that is, as distinguished from love—encourage
marriage: for example, couldn't M1 marryeven though he receives
utility from F2's consumption, and even if he wants to transfer resources
to F2? One incentive to combine marriage and caring is that resources
are more cheaply transferred within households: by assumption, com-
modities cannot be transferred between households, and goods and time
presumably also are more readily transferred within households. More-
over, caring partly results from living together,14 and some couples marry
partly because they anticipate the effect of living together on their caring.
Since, therefore, caring does encourage (and is encouraged by) mar-
riage, there is a justification for the economist's usual assumption that even
a multiperson household has a single well-ordered preference function.
For, if one member of a household—the "head"—cares enough about all
other members to transfer resources to them, this household would act
as i/it maximized the "head's" preference function, even if the preferences
of other members are quite different.1 5
Output is generally less divisible between mates in marriages with
caring than in other marriages'6 because caring makes some output a
12 The output of love raises these incomes even further.
13 The difference between k and 6 measures the output of love produced by M1
and F2.
14 So does negative caring or "hatred." A significani fraction of all murders and
assaults involve members of the same household (see Ehrlich 1970).
15 For a proof, see section1 of the Appendix; further discussions can be found in
Becker (1969).
16 See the proof in section 2 of the Appendix.
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family commodity, which cannot be divided between mates. One implica-
tion of this is that marriages with caring are less likely to be part of the
optimal sorting than marriages without caring that have the same total
income (and thus have a greater total output).'7
Another implication is that the optimal of different traits can
be significantly affected by caring, even if the degree of caring and the
value of a trait are unrelated. Part I (1973) shows that when the division
of output is so restricted that each mate receives a given fraction of the
output of his or her marriage, beneficial traits are always strongly positively
correlated in the optimal sorting. A negative correlation, on the other
hand, is sometimes optimal when output is fully divisible. Caring could
convert what would be an optimal negative correlation into an optimal
positive one because of the restrictions it imposes on the division of
output.
For example, assume that a group of men and women differ only in
wage rates, and that each potential marriage has mutual and f'Lll caring,
so that the degree of caring is in this case uncorrelated with the level of
wage rates; then the optimal correlation between wage rates would be
positive, although I showed in Part I (1973) that it is negative when there
is no caring.1 8 The (small amount of) evidence in that paper indicating
that wage rates are negatively correlated suggests, therefore, that caring
does not completely determine the choice of marriage mates.
3.Polygamy
Although monagamous unions predominate in the world today, some
societies still practice polygamy, and it was common at one time. What
determines the incidence of polygamous unions in societies that permit
them, and why have they declined in importance over time?
I argued in Part I(1973) that polyandrists—women with several
husbands—have been much less common than polygynists—men with
several wives—because the father's identity is doubtful under polyandry.
Todas of India did practice polyandry, but their ratio of men to women
17Seethe example discussed in section 2 of the Appendix.
18Asan example, let the matrix of outputs from different combinations of wage rates be
5 10
(5, 5) (10, 10)
12 15
(12, 12)(15, 15)
If outputs were fully divisible, the optimal sorting would be and since
that maximizes the combined output over all marriages. With mutual and full caring in
all marriages, the income of each mate equals the output in his or her marriage; these
incomes are given in parenthesis. Clearly, the optimal sorting would now be
andM F
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was much above one, largely due to female infanticide.'9 They mitigated
the effects of uncertainty about the father by usually having brothers (or
other close relatives) marry the same woman.
I showed in Part I (1973) that if all men and all women were identical,
if the number of men equaled the number of women, and if there were
diminishing returns from adding an additional spouse to a household,
then a monogamous sorting would be optimal, and therefore would
maximize the total output of commodities over all marriages.20 If the
plausible assumption of diminishing returns is maintained, inequality in
various traits among men or in the number of men and women would be
needed to explain polygyny.
An excess of women over men has often encouraged the spread of
polygyny, with the most obvious examples resulting from wartime deaths
of men. Thus, almost all the male population in Paraguay were killed
during a war with Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in the nineteenth
century,2' and apparently polygyny spread afterward.
Yet, polygyny has occurred even without an excess of women; indeed,
the Mormons practiced polygyny on a sizable scale with a slight excess of
men.22 Then inequality among men is crucial.
If the "productivity" of men differs, a polygynous sorting could be
optimal, even with constant returns to scale and an equal number of men
and women. Total output over all marriages could be greater if a second
wife to an able man added more to output than she would add as a first
wife to a less able one. Diminishing marginal products of men or women
within each household do not rule out that a woman could have a higher
marginal product as a second wife in a more productive household than as
the sole wife in a less productive household.
Consider, for example, two identical women who would produce 5
units of output if single, and two different men who would each produce
8 and 15 units, respectively, if single. Let the married outputs be 14
and 27 when each man has one wife, and 18 and 35 when each has two.23
Clearly, total output is greater if the abler man takes two wives and the
See Rivers (1906). Whether the infanticide causedpolyandry,or the reverse, is not
clear.
20 An optimal sorting has the property that persons not married to each other could
not, by marrying, make some better off without making others worse off. I show in Part 1
(1973) that an optimal sorting maximizes total output of commodities.
21 After the war, males were only 13 percent of the total population of Paraguay (see
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1973 ed., s.v. "Paraguay"). I owe this reference to T. W. Schultz.
22 See Young (1954,p. 124). The effective number of women can exceed the number of
men, even with an equal number at each age, if women marry earlier than men and if
widowed women remarry. The number of women married at any time would exceed the
number of men married because women would be married longer (to different men—
they would be sequentially polyandrous!). This apparently was important in Sub.
Saharan Africa, where polygyny was common (see Dorjahn 1959).
23 These numbers imply diminishing marginal products, since 18—14=4<6,
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other remains single than if they both take one wife: 35 + 8 =43> 14 +
27 =41.If the abler man received, say, 21 units and each wife received,
say, 7 units, no one would have any incentive to change mates.
Our analysis implies generally that polygyny would be more frequent
among more productive men—such as those with large farms, high
positions, and great strength—an implication strongly supported by the
evidence on polygyny. For example, only about 10—20 percent of the
Mormons had more than one wife,24 and they were the more successful
and prominent ones. Although 40 percent of the married men in a sample
of the Xavante Indians of Brazil were polygynous, "it was the chief and-
theheads of clans who enjoyed the highest degree of polygyny" (Salzano,
Ned, and Maybury-Lewis 1967, p. 473). About 35 percent of the married
men in Sub-Saharan Africa were polygynous (Dorjahn 1959, pp. 98—105),
and they were generally the wealthier men. Fewer than 10 percent of the
married men in Arab countries were polygynous, and they were the more
successful, especially in agriculture (Goode 1963, pp. 101—4).
I do not have a satisfactory explanation of why polygyny has declined
over time in those parts of the world where it was once more common.25
The declines in income inequality and the importance of agriculture
presumably have been partly responsible. Perhaps the sex ratio has
become less favorable, but that seems unlikely, wartime destruction aside.
Perhaps monogamous societies have superior genetic and even cultural
natural selection (see the next section). But since more successful men are
more likely to be polygynous, they are more likely to have relatively many
children.26 If the factors responsible for success are "inherited," selection
over time toward the "abler" might be stronger in polygynous than in
monogamous societies. I have even heard the argument that Mormons
are unusually successful in the United States because of their polygynous
past! However, if the wives of polygynous males were not as able, on the
average, as the wives of equally able monogamous males, selection could
be less favorable in polygynous societies.
The decline in polygyny isusually "explained" by religious and
legislative strictures against polygyny that are supposedly motivated by a
desire to prevent the exploitation of women. But the laws that prevent
men from taking more than one wife no more benefit women than the
24Young(1954, P. 441) says that "in some communities it ran ashigh as 20—25 percent
of the male heads of families," but Arrington (1958, p. 238) says about 10 percent of all
Mormon families were polygynous.
25Polygynywas more common in Islamic and African societies than in Western and
Asian ones, although in China and Japan concubines had some of the rights and oblig-
ations of wives (see Goode 1963, chap. 5).
26Salzano,Ned, and Maybury-Lewis (1967, p. 486) found evidence among the
Xavante Indians of "similar means but significantly greater variance for number of
surviving offspring for males whose reproduction is completed than for similar females."
This indicates that polygynous males (the more successful ones) have more children than
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laws in South Africa that restrict the ratio of black to white workers (see
Wilson 1972, p. 8) benefit blacks. Surely, laws against polygyny reduce
the "demand" for women, and thereby reduce their share of total
household output and increase the share of men.27
4.Assortive Mating, Inequality, and Natural Selection
I pointed out in Part I (1973) that assortive mating of different
traits reduces the variation in these traits between children in the same
family (and this is one benefit of such mating). Positive assortive mating
also, however, increases the inequality in traits, and thus in commodity
income, between families. Note that the effects on inequality in com-
modity and money incomes may be very different; indeed, if wage rates,
unlike most other traits, are negatively sorted (as argued in Part I),
assortive mating would reduce the inequality in money earnings and
increase that in commodity income.
Positive sorting of inherited traits, like intelligence, race, or height, also
increases the inequality in these traits among children in different
families, and increases the correlation between the traits of parents and
children (see proofs in Cavalli-Sforza and Bodmer [1971, chap. 9]).
Moreover, positive sorting, even of noninherited traits such as education,
often has the same effect because, for example, educated parents are
effectiveproducers of "education-readiness"intheir children(see
Leibowitz [1972] and the papers by her and Benham in this volume).
The result is an increase in the correlation between the commodity in-
comes of parents and children, and thereby an increase in the inequality
in commodity income among families spanning several generations. That
is, positive assortive mating has primary responsibility for noncompeting
groups and the general importance of the family in determining economic
and social position that is so relevant for discussions of investment in
human capital and occupational position.
Since positive assortive mating increases aggregate commodity income
over all families, the level of and inequality in commodity income are
affected in different ways. Probably outlawing polygyny has reduced the
27Analternative interpretation of the religious and legislative strictures against
polygyny is that they are an early and major example of discrimination against women,
of a similar mold to the restrictions on their employment in certain occupations, such as
the priesthood, or on their ownership of property. This hypothesis has been well stated by
(of all people!) George Bernard "Polygamy when tried under modern democratic
conditions as by the Mormons, is wrecked by the revolt of the mass of inferior men
who are condemned to celibacy by it; for the maternaL instinct leads a woman to prefer
a tenth share in a first rate man to the exclusive possession of a third rate." See his
"Maxims for Revolutionists" appended to Man and Superman (Shaw 1930, p. 220).
Shaw was preoccupied with celibacy; he has three other maxims on celibacy, one being
"any marriage system which condemns a majority of the population to celibacy will be
violently wrecked on the pretext that it outrages morality" (1930, p. 220).
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inequality in commodity income among men at the price of reducing
aggregate commodity income. Perhaps other restrictions on mating
patterns that reduce inequality would be tolerated, but that does not
seem likely at present.
Since positive assortive mating increases the between-family variance,
it increases the potential for genetic natural selection, by a well-known
theorem in population genetics.28 The actual amount of selection depends
also on the inheritability of traits, and the relation between the levels of
the traits of mates and the number of their surviving children (called
"fitness" by geneticists). For example, given the degree of inheritability
of intelligence, and a positive (or negative) relation between number of
children and average intelligence of parents, the rate of increase (or
decrease) per generation in the average intelligence of a population would
be directlyrelatedtothe degree of positiveassortive mating by
intelligence.
Moreover, the degree of assortive mating is not independent of in-
heritability or of the relation between number of children and parental
traits. For example, the "cost" of higher-"quality" children may be lower
to more-intelligent parents, and this affects the number (as well as
quality) of children desired.29 In a subsequent paper I expect to treat
more systematically the interaction between the degree of assortive mating
and other determinants of the direction and rate of genetic selection.
5.Life-CycleMarital Patterns
Life-cycle dimensions of marital decisions—for instance, when to marry,
how long to stay married, when to remarry if divorced or widowed, or
how long to stay remarried—have received little attention in my earlier
paper or thus far in this one. These are intriguing but difficult questions,
and only the broad strokes of an analysis can be sketched at this time.
A separate paper in the not-too-distant future will develop a more
detailed empirical as well as theoretical analysis.
A convenient, if artificial, way to categorize the decision to marry is to
say that a person first decides when to enter the marriage market and then
searches for an appropriate mate.3° The age of entry would be earlier
1
/
28 Thistheorem was proved by Fisher (1958, pp. 37—38) and called "the fundamental
theorem of natural selection." For a more recent and extensive discussion, see Cavalli-
Sforza and Bodrrser (1971, sec. 6.7).
29Fora discussion of the interaction between the quantity and quality of children, see
Becker and Lewis (1973).
30Thiscategorization is made in an important paper by Coale and McNeil, "The
Distribution by Age of the Frequency of First Marriage in a Female Cohort" (1973).
They show that the frequency distribution of the age at first marriage can be closely fitted
in a variety of environments by the convolution of a normal distribution and two or three
exponential distributions. The normal distribution is said to represent the distribution of
age at entry into the marriage market, and the exponential distributions, the time it takes
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the larger the number of children desired, the higher the expected
lifetime income, and the lower the level of education.31
Once in the marriage market, a person searches for a mate along the
lines specified in the now rather extensive search literature.32 That is,
he searches until the value to him of any expected improvement in the
mate he can find is no greater than the cost of his time and other inputs
into additional search. Some determinants of benefits and costs are of
special interest in the context of the marriage market.
Search will be longer the greater thebenefits expected from additional
search. Since benefits will be greater the longer the expected duration of
marriage, people will search more carefully and marry later when they
expect to be married longer, for example, when divorce is more difficult
or adult death rates are lower. Search may take the form of trial living
together, consensual unions, or simply prolonged dating. Consequently,
when divorce becomes easier, the fraction of persons legally married may
actually increase because of the effect on the age at marriage. Indeed, in
Latin America, where divorce is usually impossible, a relatively small
fraction of the adult population is legally married because consensual
unions are so important (see Kogut 1972); and, in the United States, a
smaller fraction of women have been married in those states having more-
difficult divorce laws (see Freiden and his paper in this volume).33
Search would also be longer the more variable potential mates were
because then the expected gain from additional "sampling" would be
greater. Hence, other determinants being the same, marriage should
generally be later in dynamic, mobile, and diversified societies than in
static, homogeneous ones.
People marry relatively early when they are lucky in their search. They
also marry early, however, when they are unduly pessimistic about their
prospects of attracting someone better (or unduly optimistic about
persons they have already met). Therefore, early marriages contain both
lucky and pessimistic persons, while later marriages contain unlucky and
optimistic ones.
The cost of search differs greatly for different traits: the education,
income, intelligence, family background, perhaps even the health of
persons can be ascertained relatively easily, but their ambition, resiliency
under pressure, or potential for growth are ascertained with much greater
difficulty.34 The optimal allocation of search expenditures implies that
marital decisions would be based on fuller information about more-easily
searched traits than about more-difficult-to-search traits. Presumably,
Fora theoretical and empirical study of these and other variables, see Keeley (1973).
32Thepioneering paper is by Stigler (1961). For more recent developments, see McCall
(1970) and Mortensen (1970).
These results are net of differences in income, relative wages, and the sex ratio.
In the terminology of Nelson (1970), education, income, and intelligence are
"search" traits, whereas resiliency and growth potential are "experience" traits.
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therefore, an analysis of sorting that assumes perfect information (as in
Part I [1973]) would predict the sorting by more-easily searched traits,
such as education, better than the sorting by more-difficult-to-search
traits, such as resiliency.35
Married persons also must make decisions about marriage: should they
separate or divorce, and if they do, or if widowed, when, if ever, should
they remarry? The incentive to separate is smaller the more important
are investments that are "specific" to a particular marriage.36 The most
obvious and dominant example of marriage-specific investment is child-
ren, although knowledge of the habits and attitudes of one's mate is also
significant. Since specific investments would grow, at least for quite a
while, with the duration of marriage, the incentive to separate would
tend to decline with duration.
The incentive to separate is greater, on the other hand, the more con-
vinced a person becomes that the marriage was a "mistake." This
conviction could result from additional information about one's mate or
other potential mates. (Some "search" goes on, perhapssubconsciously,
even while one is married!) If the "mistake" is considered large enough
to outweigh the loss in marriage-specific capital, separation and perhaps
divorce will follow.
The analysis in Part I (1973) predicts sorting patterns in a world with
perfect information. Presumably, couples who deviate from these patterns
because they were unlucky in their search are more likely than others to
decide that they made a "mistake" and to separate as additional in-
formation is accumulated during marriage. If they remarry, they should
deviate less from these patterns than in their first marriage. For example,
couples with relatively large differences in education, intelligence, race,
or religion, because they were unlucky searchers, should be more likely to
separate,37 and should have smaller differences when they remarry. In
the subsequent paper referred to earlier, I plan to develop more system-
atically the implications of this analysis concerning separation, divorce,
and remarriage, and to test them with several bodies of data.
6.Summary
The findings from this extension of my earlier paper on "The Theory of
Marriage" (1973) include:
a) An explanation of why persons who care for each other are more
likely to marry each other than are otherwise similar persons who do not.
Seethe discussion in section 3 of the Appendix.
36Thedistinction between general and specific investment is well known, and can be
found in Becker (1964, chap. 1 1). Children, for example, would be a specific investment
if the pleasure received by a parent were smaller when the parent was (permanently)
separated from the children.
Ifthey have relatively large differences because they were less efficient searchers,
they may be less likely to separate.S24 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
This in turn provides a justification for assuming that each family acts as
if it maximizes a single utility function.
b) An explanation of why polygyny, when permitted, has been more
common among successful men and, more generally, why inequality
among men and differences in the number of men and women have been
important in determining the incidence of polygyny.
c)Ananalysis of the relation between natural selection over time and
assortive mating, which is relevant, among other things, for understanding
the persistence over several generations of differences in incomes between
different families.
d) An analysis of which marriages are more likely to terminate in
separation and divorce, and of how the assortive mating of those re-
marrying differs from the assortive mating in their first marriages.
The discussion in this paper is mainly a series of preliminary reports on
more extensive studies in progress. The fuller studies will permit readers
to gain a more accurate assessment of the value of our economic approach
in understanding marital patterns.
Mathematical Appendix
1. Formally, M (or F) maximizes his utility function
Urn = Um(Zm, Z1) (Al)




whereandare the market allocations of output to M and F, and Cm is the
amount transferred by M to F. If Cm > 0, these constraints can be reduced to a
single income constraint by substitution from the Zf into the Zrn equation:
mmf= Zmf=+=Zrn+ Z1, (A3)
where Zmi is the output produced by M and F, and mmf is M's income. Maximiz-
ation of Urn subject to this single income constraint gives
öUm A4
If Cm0, Urn is maximized subject to the two constraints Zm° = Zm and= Z,.
The equilibrium conditions are aUm/aZm= = Pm' whereand
Pm are the marginal utilities of additionaland Z,°, respectively. The income of
M would then be
mmf = + (A5)
where PrnRmisthe "shadow" price of Z1 to M irs terms of Zm.
SincePm/Am < 1 (otherwise Cm > 0),
+ <Zrni = Z+Z7. (A6)A THEORY OF MARRIAGE S25
If Cm > 0, the "family" consisting of M and F would act as if it maximized the
single "family" utility function Urn subject to the single family budget constraint
given by (A3), even if F's utility function were quite different from Urn. In effect,
transfers between members eliminate the conflict between different members'
utility functions.
2. Total income in a marriage between M and F is
+ fmf = 'ml = Zm1 + PmZmhi + p1Z:,,
where 'ml is the total income in the marriage, and are the outputs
allocated to M and F, Zmi (=Zrn'i + Z,',) is total output, Pm is the shadow price
to M of a unit ofand p1 is a shadow price to F of a unit of Their incomes
must be in the intervals
+ Prn2n,'i = mml < Zm1,
(A7)
Zrn'i+
p1 = fmf 0 and Zmj.
But if Pm = Pf = 1—mutual and full caring—then mml = fmf = Zmi. And,
more generally, and p1 > 0, then
< Z,,,1 < 'ml'
(A8)
Z:,<fml ￿ Z,,,1<







On the surface, both sortings are equally optimal, but this is not so if only M1
and F2 have a marriage with caring, say full and mutual, so that m12 = 112 =
Thesorting M1F2 and M2F1 is not as viable as the sorting M1F1 and M2F2
because income is more divisible between M1 and F1 than between M1 and F2.39
For if, say, m11 = = 34,m22= 44, andf22 = 24, no two persons have
an incentive to change mates and marry each other.4° On the other hand, since
rn,2 =112=4, unless m21 = 3 andf21 =4,either M1 and F1, or M2 and F2
would be better off by marrying each other. If m21 = 3 andf21 = 4, M, and F1,
and M2 and F2 could be just as welt off by marrying each other. Therefore, this
sorting is not as viable as the sorting that does not have any marriages with caring.
3. Assume that the gain from marriage of a particular person M is positively
related to the expected values of two traits of his mate, as in m = g(A1, A2), with
38Theou€pulbetweenM1 and F2 also equals four, half that between M, and F,.
Or, put differently, the output between M, and F1 exceeds that between M, and
F2.
40F2would prefer to marry M,, but could not induce M, to do so because rn12
cannot exceed four, the output produced by M, and F2 (see eq. {A7]), which is less than
rn,,=
/
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3g/3A1 =g1> 0, 1 =1,2. If the marginal costs of search were c1 and c2 for A1
and A2, respectively, equilibrium requires that
(AlO)
g2 C2
Thelower c1 is relative to c2, the higher generally would be the equilibrium value
of A1 relative to A2, since convexity of the isogain curves is a necessary condition
for an internal maximum.
If g1 and g2 were invariant when search .costs changed to all participants in
the marriage market, not an innocuous assumption, then and would
be the equilibrium values of A1 and A2 to M when everyone had perfect inform-
ation about all traits. A reduction in the cost of searching A1, therefore, would
move the equilibrium value of A1 to M closer to its value with perfect
information.
I -4